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Impact of Adverse Economic Shocks on the Indian Child Labour Market and the 
Schooling of Children of Poor Households 
B. Karan Singh 
 
Introduction 
Developing economies are subject to frequent adverse economic shocks. In the wake of any 
adverse economic shocks, the poor are likely to suffer more than others. Since the formal credit 
market is barely accessible to the poor, borrowing options to smoothen their consumption stream 
is unworkable, and the reliance on the informal credit market is always an expensive option. So, 
what do poor people do in the face of adverse economic shocks? Poor Indian households are not 
self-insured against economic or income shocks. At present, the financial market does not offer 
any popular or successful products to the poor Indian households to hedge against shocks. 
However, the Indian government does offer direct as well as indirect cash/in-kind transfers to the 
poor to diminish the impact of adverse economic shocks. In case the government supports are not 
a full insurance, households might take their own decisions to overcome the adverse economic 
shocks and that could have a major effect on the economy. Household-level decisions could be 
detrimental to long-term economic development if it disrupts children’s education. Education is 
the long-term equalizer of a society and educating the poor household’s children could stop the 
transmission of inter-generation poverty. 
There is much literature to prove that economic shocks have an impact on children’s schooling 
and the child labour market. Pörtner (2001) found that children were often used as insurance 
against negative income shocks. Grimm (2009) found that the temporal drought shocks affected 
children’s schooling by resulting in food inflation, which translated to a loss of purchasing 
power. In this case, parents smooth their consumption by discontinuing their children from 
school and letting them work. Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) found that children in rural India 
discontinued their education due crop failures. In the case of developing countries, a number of 
studies have thus focused on adverse shocks to the agricultural sector affecting children’s 
education. However, the study by Behrman et al. (1999) found that macroeconomic stability and 
international trade factors could also affect children’s education. Guarcello et al. (2009) assessed 
the impact of individual shocks and collective shocks on households and found that adverse 
shocks resulted in an increase in child labour. Skoufias and Parker (2002) found that severity of 
the economic shocks affecting children’s joining the next year of school varied depending on the 
child’s gender. They argued that female children were more likely to stay at home to help with 
domestic work. Manning (2000) found that temporary shocks could push children permanently 
into the labour force. 
So, there is enough evidence to show the impact of adverse economic shocks on children’s 
schooling and child labour. However, one could argue that could child labour is pro-cyclical. 
This is possible if child labour is demand-driven. In such a scenario, economic shocks would 
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push the economy to a lower level of activity. This would result in a lower demand for labour, 
and hence a lower demand for child labour. Thus, during an economic shock, one might expect 
higher enrollment of poor students in schools, which would allow them to benefit from the 
minimum incentives of attending school, for example, free mid-day meals for all students, 
provided by the Indian government. 
This paper has seven sections. The first section is the introduction. The second section describes 
the evidence of adverse economic shocks, fact of child labour in India and the related literature. 
The third section is the theoretical model developed to describe the child labour market in the 
face of adverse economic shocks and also analyse the government intervention in the child 
labour market through the conditional in-kind transfer programme. The fourth section contains 
the data construction methods and sources. The fifth and sixth section discuss the empirical 
model and the results, respectively. The penultimate section describes the limitation of the study, 
and the eighth and last section is the conclusion. 
In the paper, I extend the theoretical work of Basu and Van (1998) with special reference to 
adverse economy shocks. Firstly, I theoretically prove that child labour could be counter-cyclical 
even if there is a conditional in-kind transfer for attending school. Secondly, I empirically model 
and prove that child labour is counter-cyclic in case of India. During a crisis, children join the 
labour force to raise the household income; this could be because children wage income is higher 
than the condition in-kind transfer to attend the school. 
Adverse Economic Shocks in India 
Economic shocks1 may come in many forms and their acuteness depends on the structure of the 
economy. In the beginning of the 1990s, the structure of the Indian economy was dominated by 
the agricultural sector. According to the National Sample Survey Organisation’s (NSSO) 
employment and unemployment household survey for the reference period 1993-94, agriculture 
supported the livelihood of over 74 percent of households in the country. However, the structure 
of the economy has seen dramatic changes due to the introduction of liberalisation policies in 
1991. This change was captured in the employment and unemployment survey2 of 2009-10, 
conducted by the Ministry of Labour and Employment − in 2009-10, agriculture accounted for 
only 45 percent of the labour force. 
                                                           
1 My research focuses on adverse economic shocks, which affect a group of people, or collective shocks such as drought, flood, recession and 
food inflation. I do not deal with shocks pertaining to individual households. 
2 This was the first survey conducted by the Ministry of Labour and Employment, and the survey does not capture the household characteristics 
such as those captured by the NSSO surveys. The Ministry of Labour and Employment survey is a thin survey (i.e. which covers a smaller sample 
size). The NSSO conducts thick employment and unemployment surveys (i.e. which cover a larger sample size) once in five years. However, in 
recent years, since 1999 onward, in between the five years of the thick survey, the NSSO also conducts thin employment and unemployment 
surveys. Thin surveys have few limitations in interpreting or linking with thick survey results. The NSSO thick employment and unemployment 
survey results for the reference period 2009‐10 are officially scheduled to public release in 2011. This survey is expected to capture the impact 
of the global financial crisis on Indian households. 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Shocks to the economy can come from different sources. Shocks that impinge directly on the 
economy are very visible and manifest themselves as a fall in output or in higher inflation. When 
the economy was dominated by agriculture, the failure of sufficient rainfall in the monsoons 
period served as a large shock. In the recent decades, India has had significant agricultural 
shocks due to the failure of the monsoons over a number of years (1972-73, 1979-80, 1987-88, 
2002-03 and 2009-10). Survey evidence by Cole et al. (2009) during the 2004 and 2006 from 
two Indian states, namely, Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat, found that 99 percent of the agriculture- 
dependent households reported that variation in local rainfall was the most severe risk that they 
faced. Regions that have seen an increase in the coverage of irrigated land may have been better 
protected against the vagaries of the monsoons. However, there could be many other shocks to 
the agricultural sector, such as pests, insects, the non-availability of key inputs to farmers etc. 
Moving away from agriculture to industry or services might have also helped mitigate the impact 
of a monsoon failure. As of 2009-10, the share of the industry and services sectors was also 
significant with regard to the total output and employment in the economy. So, shocks to the 
non-agricultural sector would also have had an impact on the economy as a whole. The 
liberalisation policies of 1991 concentrated mainly on changes in the manufacturing sector. Thus, 
one might theorize that the industrial sector would be most affected by global shocks in the 
economy. India could have been affected by the following global shocks – the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, the 2000 Dotcom bubble burst and the 2007 global financial crisis. Since most 
services are within the non-tradable sector, there have been no significant shocks that have 
directly impacted the services sector in the past. 
Facts and Literature on Child Labour in India 
Children’s education plays a very crucial role in the development of poor households. Such 
households usually have little or no physical assets and so, educating the children could 
potentially help break the vicious cycle of poverty through human capital accumulation. At the 
same time, child labour in India continues to be a matter of concern. However, India does not 
have very good statistical information on the incidence of child labour. The definition of child 
labour as well as misreporting by guardians during official surveys underestimates the rate of 
child labour. The NSSO’s exclusive ad hoc survey on education (Education in India: 2007-08) 
found that the most important reasons for non-enrollment in or discontinuation from educational 
institutions were that the parents were uninterested in educating their children, financial 
constraints and that education was not considered necessary. However, the cost of education 
seems to be the dominant obstacle in educating the children of poor households. The survey 
found that, out of those children who discontinued their education in the age groups 5-9 and 10-
13, about 24.8 percent and 23.8 percent, respectively, discontinued owing to financial 
constraints. For the same age groups, out of those children who had never enrolled in the first 
place, about 22.8 percent and 28.7 percent did not enroll because of financial constraints. Only a 
very small proportion of the respondents cited child labour as a reason. As argued by Basu 
(1999) and Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005), this could be because of the limitation in official 
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surveys on information about child labour. Also, households headed by those who consider 
education unnecessary may have been using their children for domestic work or sending them to 
work elsewhere, leading to serious under-reporting. 
The 2001 Census estimated that there were 12 million child labourers in the country. With the 
help of the NSSO household surveys, I estimate the children’s labour force participation for the 
age groups of 5-9 and 10-14. Assuming the response rate of child labour force participation is 
constant. I find that child labour force participation is falling over time, but that it is still 
significant for the age group of 10-14, and that it is marginal for the age group of 5-9. Figure 1 
provides the child labour force participation rate for the age group of 10-14.  
Figure1. Child Labour Force Participation Rate Age between 10 and 14 ( in percent)
 
Source: NSSO 
An important factor that could underlie this fall could be the fall in the incidence of poverty in 
the country. There are a number of research papers to support the theory that poverty is the main 
underlying cause of incidence of child labour (e.g. Blunch and Verner - 2000, Baland and 
Robinson - 2000 etc). The Indian Planning Commission estimated that the incidence of poverty3 
fell from 26.1 percent in 1999-2000 to 21.8 percent in 2004-05. However, the existing incidence 
of poverty remains very high. The Planning Commission estimated that there were 238.5 million 
people living in poverty in 2004-05.  
Apart from the fall in poverty, other factors could also have contributed to a fall in the incidence 
of child labour - improvements in the educational infrastructure, an increase in the return on 
                                                           
3  Incidence  of  poverty  is  measured  by  the  percentage  of  people  living  below  the  poverty  line.  The  Planning 
Commission  is  the  nodal  agency,  which  estimates  the  incidence  of  poverty.  Estimates  are  based  on  the  large 
consumer expenditure survey conducted by the National Sample Survey Organisation conducted once in five years. 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education, an increase in the adult wage rate and the launch of educational programmes for poor 
households.  
Microeconomic studies of India by Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) and Duflo and Pande 
(2007), cited in Edmonds et al. (2007), focus on the district4 as the relevant labour market unit 
because of very low rates of permanent mobility between districts. This has been captured in the 
observation of the district-level child labour participation. While the incidence of child labour 
force participation has been declining across the country as a whole, there remain locational 
differences. Table 1 presents the child labour force participation for urban and rural areas across 
districts for the year 2004-05, using the NSSO employment and unemployment survey. 
Table 1. Child Labour Force Participation Rate, Labour and Population Age Group of 10- 
14 years (2004-05) 
Participation Rate Rural Urban 
(Range) No of Districts Labour Population No of Districts Labour Population 
(%) (No.) (In thousands) (No.) (In thousands) 
0 288 0 35918 355 0 7937 
0.001-4 141 523 28498 122 258 12113 
5-9 63 803 10751 45 198 3008 
10-14 34 607 4986 24 123 995 
15-19 22 660 3898 6 17 97 
20-29 17 829 3483 12 81 327 
30 & above 13 576 1535 7 29 88 
Total 578 3999 89069 571 707 24565 
Source: Own calculations using NSSO houlholds survey 2004-05 
The incidence of child labour is not the same across districts, and it seems that child labour is 
more a rural phenomenon than an urban one. 
In case of India, Edmonds et al (2007) found that the low level of enrolment in schools is 
primarily because of the incidence of poverty rather than parental preferences. I look at the 
correlation between the standard of living and child labour force participation rate and school 
enrollment rate at district level. I find that there exists a negative correlation between child 
labour force participation and living standards. Conversely, there exists a positive correlation 
between school enrollment rate and living standards. 
 
                                                           
4 A district is an administrative division of an Indian state or union territory. 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Fig 2. Relationship between the Standard of Living, Children’s School Enrollment Rate 
and Children Labor Force Participation Rate. 
 
Note: Standards of living are measured by monthly real per capita consumption expenditure using four rounds (55th, 
56th, 57th and 58th) of the NSSO sample households survey between 1999 and 2002. Real monthly per capita 
expenditure has been deflated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) - CPI of agricultural labourers for the rural 
population and the CPI of urban non-manual employees for the urban population). The difference in cost of living 
between states is adjusted by the state-level poverty line estimates given by the Indian Planning Commission.   
Basu et al. (2010) found that due to imperfections in the adult labour market, the households of 
two Indian states, namely Himachal Pradesh and Uttaranchal, used their children on the farms 
instead of hiring adult labour outside the family. 
However, the study’s findings cannot be applied to the country as whole, because district-level 
evidence shows that many districts with low levels of living standards do have a large child 
labour market for market work. 
The Theory 
In this section, I discuss the theoretical model of the child labour market. I use the theoretical 
model constructed by Basu and Van (1998) with some alterations of a few assumptions. I create 
three scenarios – the first scenario is the basic model, which illustrates why households decide to 
send their children to the labour market. The second scenario is modeled to explain effect of 
conditional in-kind transfer to the poor children who attend school. The last scenario shows the 
impact of adverse economic shocks in the labour market when the government provides 
conditional in-kind transfers to the children who attend school. 
The Basic Model  
The main assumptions of the model are a combination of selected assumptions from Basu and 
Van (1998) and the assumptions I introduced in the model. The assumptions I follow from Basu 
and Van (1998) are that all the households are identical in size, the economy produces single 
consumption goods, all firms are identical, and a household will send the children to the labour 
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market if the household income drops below the subsistence level of consumption (the luxury 
axiom) and from a firm’s point of view, adult and child labourers are substitutes (the substitution 
axiom). The assumptions I introduce in the model are unequal distribution of capital to the 
households, cost of education is zero, households consume all its income, the credit market don’t 
exist and all firms’ capital is owned by households. 
Some assumptions are used for the expositional purposes, which make the numerical calculations 
easy to understand. For example, households are considered to consist of one adult and one child 
- two parents are considered to be one adult. Similarly, two children are considered to be one 
child. The family preference is described in equation 1 by a binary relation defined in the set.  
                                                                          (1)  
Where c is the consumption by each family member and e is the child work effort, which can 
only take the value 0 or 1. The assumptions are that adults always work no matter what the 
wages are and that a child’s consumption is equal to that of an adult. A family sends its children 
only if the family income does not the meet the minimum subsistence level of per capita 
household consumption Sis exogenously determined. Total number of Households NT is 
classified into two groups; one group consists of total poor households NPH, whose income is less 
than 2S,and the other group consists of total rich households NRH, whose income is greater than 
or equal to 2S. Incidence of poverty is denoted as γ. 
                                                                                      (2) 
Households are indexed by i, where i = 1,…,NT.. Each household has the following income 
function. 
                                                                                   (3) 
Where  
‘Ii” total income of household ‘i’  
‘ei’ child work effort in household ‘i’ 
‘ki’ capital owned by household ‘i’ 
‘w’ market wage for an adult labourer 
 ‘η’ state of the economy, captures any positive or negative shocks in the economy 
Rich households are indexed by i, i = 1,…,NRH. Each rich household has the following income 
function. 
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,∀ I >2S& e=0                                                                      (4) 
Poor households are index by i, i = 1,…,NPH. Each household has the following income function. 
,∀ I <2S& e=1                                                                    (5) 
The labour supply N comprises of the total adults in the economy NTA , Child labour supply NPHC 
is the number of poor household children.  
                                                                                            (6) 
To derive the market demand for adult and child labourers, adults and children are assumed to be 
substitutes in production subject to adult-equivalent scaling, given by λ, where 0< λ<1. It is also 
assumed that the economy produces single consumption goods, and NF is the number of identical 
firms.  
Each firm’s production function is 
                                                                 (7) 
Where xj is firm j’s output of consumption goods, Aj and Cj are the number of adult labourers and 
child labourers employed in the firm. The firm is a wage taker. Firm j chooses the Aj and Cj 
where it reaches the maximum profit.  
                                                                (8) 
Where w is the adult wage rate. The firm pays wλ to the child, i.e., adjusted to the adult-
equivalent scale. Firms always ensure the following condition. 
                                                                       (9) 
Now I describe the basic model in a diagrammatic representation. The labour market and 
households’ decision to send the children together determine the number of children to be sent to 
the labour market and the wage in the labour market. The labour market and household’s 
decision are portrayed in panel (a) and panel (b) of Figure 3.  
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Figure 3. Basic Model of the Child Labour Market 
(a)        (b) 
 
In figure 3, panel (a), the Y-axis represents the wage rate and X-axis represents the number of 
labourers. AB is the supply for adult labour. The quantity supply of adult labour is NTA and the 
adult-equivalent scalar adjusted quantity supply child labour is λNPHC is the number of poor 
household children. Adult-equivalent scalar is defined as λ, where 0<λ<1. CD is the supply of 
adult labour, E’F’ is the aggregate supply of adult and child labour. The horizontal difference 
between CD and E’F’ is equal to λ multiplied by NPHC. EF is the maximum adult and children 
labour supply in the economy. E’F’ is less than EF, because rich households exist in the 
economy. Those households whose income is less than the minimum level of subsistence 
consumption 2S determine the number of poor household children 
Here, I discuss the reason why households send their children to the labour market.  In Figure 3, 
panel (b), the Y-axis represents the household’s income level and X-axis represents the number 
of households. Households derive income from the endowment of labour and capital. 
Households have equal amounts of endowment in labour but different levels of endowment in 
capital. The income curve for the households’ income is upward-sloping because of the 
difference in capital endowments. The income curve for rich households is named GH, whose 
income is greater than 2S.Theincome curve for the household whose income is less than 2S is 
named IJ, and will have a different slope. I assume IJ is flatter than GH because poor households 
receive wage income from both the adult and the child. In other words, if the poor households 
don’t send their children to the labour market, their income curve will be placed south from the 
IJ curve. The horizontal line KL is the minimum subsistence level of consumption. The vertical 
 11 
 
distance between x-axis and KL is 2S. In this scenario, the equilibrium point has settled at x, and 
the number of child labourers in the market is NPHC and the adult wage is w0. 
Figure 4. Extended Model of Child Labour when the Government Provides Conditional In-
kind Transfer to Children who Attend School 
(a)        (b) 
 
Initially, the economy is at equilibrium x. Now the government starts the conditional in-kind 
transfer programme to increase the children’s school enrollment. The conditional in-kind transfer 
programme provides mid-day meals to children who attend school. In figure 4, panel (b), TS is 
the amount of money spent on a mid-day meal per child. This will have an impact on the 
minimum subsistence consumption level. Since the government spends amount TS per child in 
the form of in-kind transfers, I assume that this will not have an equal reduction in a households’ 
subsistence consumption level. So, the household subsistence consumption level is reduced by 
δTS and the KL line shifts downward by δTS, where 0<δ<1. The new minimum level of the 
subsistence curve is K’L’. So, initially, some portion of the households will take their children 
from the labour market and send them to school. As a result, the wage rate in the labour market 
will go up. The households who gain sufficiently from the rise in wage income and will also send 
their children to school. In this process, the labour supply curve E’’F’’ will take place leftwards 
from the previous labour supply curve E’F’. And the labour market will reach equilibrium y from 
x and adult wage will be w1, greater than w0. 
A rise in the wage rate will have different effects on different households, depending on their 
capital endowment. The income will go up for those households whose major income is derived 
from wage income. At the same time, income will fall for the households whose major income 
source is capital endowment. Because the return of capital (or the firms’ profit) will come down 
due to the rise in wage cost, the income curve for the rich households will be G’H’. The line 
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G’H’ is lengthier than GH because many poor households move to the rich household group due 
to the wage raise gain and the conditional in-kind transfer programme. However, rich households 
will now get less than the previous income level. So, the G’H’ income line will intersect GH. At 
the same time, the income curve for the poor households will be shorter than IJ. The new curve 
will be I’J’. It will be placed above IJ, because the poor also benefit due to the gain from the 
wage rise. 
Figure 5. The Child Labour Market in the face of Adverse Economic Shock and the 
Governments provides Conditional In-kind Transfers to Children who Attend School.  
(a)        (b) 
 
 
In this scenario, the economy is at equilibrium y, and it is faced with an adverse economic shock. 
As a result, the aggregate demand for labour shifts downwards from AB to A`B`, and the 
economy reaches the new equilibrium z, Total labour supply is raise E```F``` from E``F`` 
because of many households’ income level fall below the subsistence level of income and more 
child labour will enter to the labour market. 
In figure 5, panel (b), due to the adverse economic shock, the firms’ profit and wage rate will 
come down. As a result, the rich households’ income curve will shift downwards from G’H’ to 
G’’H’’. Due to the fall in profit and wage rate, some rich households would move to the poor 
household group. Since the poor households’ income would also come down because of fall of 
wage rate. The new income curve for poor households will move downwards from I’J’ to I’’J’’. 
Since the conditional in-kind or cash transfer is constant during the adverse economic shock it 
does not make any difference households decision. Hence, the theoretical model shows that child 
labour could be counter-cyclical even if conditional in-kind or cash transfer were given to 
children to attend in schools. 
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Data Construction and Sources  
I have used panel data for the empirical model. It covers the period between 1999 and 2002, and 
358 districts in India. The detailed definitions and constructions of the variables are explained in 
Table 2. The data sources of the exercise are based on the different rounds of NSSO’s sample 
household surveys and Census 2001. 
Table  2. Data Sources and Definitions 
Name of the Variable Definition/Construction of Variable Source 
 
Child labour force participation rate 
 
District-wise percentage of children between the age groups of 10 and 14, 
involved in full-time gainful economic activity. 
 
Four rounds (55th, 56th, 57th and 58th) of the 
NSSO’s sample household surveys 
between 1999 and 2002. 
Children’s school enrollment rate Districts-wise percentage of children between the age groups of 10 and 
14, enrolled in school. 
-do- 
Employment dependency on agriculture District-wise percentage of agriculture employment. -do- 
Coverage of the mid-day meal 
programme 
Districts-wise percentage of children who consume at least 15 meals in a 
month under the  mid-day meal programme 
-do- 
Real per capita monthly expenditure Districts-wise average real monthly per capita expenditure has been 
deflated by the Consumer Price Indices (CPI) - CPI of agricultural 
labourers for the rural population and the CPI of urban non-manual 
employees for the urban population. The difference in the cost of living 
between states has been adjusted by the state-level poverty line estimates 
given by the Indian Planning Commission. 
Nominal per-capita consumption at the 
district level has been sourced from four 
rounds (55th, 56th, 57th and 58th) of the 
NSSO’s sample household surveys. CPI 
data has been sourced from the Labour 
Bureau. The poverty line data has been 
sourced from the Indian Planning 
Commission. 
Transport infrastructure Districts-wise percentage of villages with bus services. Census 2001. 
School infrastructure  Districts-wise percentage of villages which have middle school. -do- 
 
The Empirical Model and Results 
The empirical model consists of two stages. The first stage explores the determinants of 
children’s school enrollment rate and child labour participation in India. Determinants are 
classified as income and non-income factors. The second stage analyses the impact of adverse 
income shocks on school enrollment and child labour participation. If the first stage shows that 
income does not play an important role in determining children’s school enrollment rate and 
child labour participation, then there is no need to extend the empirical exploration to second 
stage. Hence, the results of the first stage of analysis are the precondition for the second stage 
analysis.  
The models for the determinants of children’s school enrollment rate and child labour 
participation model is as follows. 
                                                              (10) 
The expected signs of the coefficients are η>0,κ<0,τ>0,ν>0,ρ>0. 
                                                               (11) 
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The expected signs of the coefficients are α<0,β>0,χ<0,φ<0. 
Where i = district and t = time, 
CS = children’s school enrollment rate, 
CW = child labour force participation rate, 
Y= real per capita consumption, 
AE=share of agriculture employment, 
R=transport infrastructure, 
S= school infrastructure, 
Z= coverage of mid-day meal programme, 
ε/ω capture the unobserved characteristics. 
If a child has only two options – either to go to school or to join the labour force - then the 
factors that influence her towards joining the labour force are the same factors that influence her 
not to enroll in school. However, in the real world, a child may have the option of not being 
either in the labour market or in school. Also, guardians may give full information if a child goes 
to school, but may misreport if she is in the labour force. Therefore, to avoid anomalies, I have 
separate models for the determinants for child schooling and child labour participation. The 
independent variables consist of income and non-income factors. Real per capita consumption is 
proxy for income. The non-income factors - school infrastructure, transport infrastructure and 
agriculture employment are control variables used to capture the time-invariant characteristics of 
districts. The coverage of mid-day meal programme is a proxy to measure the government 
intervention in the child labour market. The correlation matrix of the independent variables is 
given in Table 3. Correlation coefficients among the independent variables are low, which shows 
no problem of multicollinearity. 
Table 3. Correlation Coefficients between Independent Variables 
 Y AE S R Z 
Y 1.00     
AE -0.40 1.00    
S 0.23 -0.30 1.00   
R 0.37 -0.28 0.34 1.00  
Z 0.02 -0.02 0.12 0.23 1.00 
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To estimate equations 5 and 6, the possible model estimation methods are OLS (ordinary least 
squares), fixed effects and random effects techniques. The choice between random effects and 
fixed effects models is decided by the Hausman test. If the test finds that there are no fixed 
effects, then we choose between OLS and random effect by applying the Breush-Pagan Lagrange 
Multiplier test. Time-fixed effects are included based on the results of the joint test. If the Wald 
test indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity, we use robust regression. 
Table 4. The Empirical Results of Determinants of Children’s School Enrollment and 
Child Labour Participation 
  Dependent Variable 
 CS CW 
Name of Independent 
Variable Fixed Random Random Random, Robust Fixed Random Random Random, Robust 
Y 6.16*** 7.24*** 6.59*** 7.24*** -2.11*** -2.24*** -2.06*** -2.24*** 
 [1.38] [1.08] [1.13] [1.09] [0.66] [0.49] [0.52] [0.44] 
AE -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03** 
 [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
S 6.00E-07 5.86E-06 6.14E-06 5.86e-06** -6.03E-07 -2.63E-06 -2.80E-06 -2.63e-06* 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
R 0.01 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.10***     
 [0.20] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]     
Z 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.10** -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 [0.09] [0.07] [0.07] [0.05] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] 
Year=2000   0.11    0.14  
   [1.10]    [0.53]  
Year=2001   1.75    -0.77  
   [1.14]    [0.54]  
Year=2002   1.7    -0.16  
   [1.13]    [0.54]  
Constant 73.5*** 65.5*** 65.6*** 65.5*** 6.7*** 7.8*** 7.7*** 7.8*** 
 [9.63] [2.74] [2.76] [2.80] [1.57] [1.26] [1.28] [1.25] 
Observations 1433 1433 1433 1433 1437 1437 1437 1437 
No of Districts 358 358 358 358 359 359 359 359 
Diagnostics Tests 
Hausman test (Prob> chi2)# 0.32       0.42      
BPLM test  (Prob> chi2)##  0.00    0.00   
Joint test (Prob> f) ###   0.23    0.34  
Wald test (Prob> chi2)#### 0.00       0.00       
# Null hypothesis is that the preferred model is random effects vs. the alternative (the fixed effects). 
 ## Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (BPLM) test, Null hypothesis is that variances across districts is zero. 
### Null hypothesis is that all the year coefficients are jointly equal to zero. 
#### Null hypothesis is homoskedasticity. 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
Robust standard errors and standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table 4 presents the empirical results of the determinant models. Equations 5 and 6 indicate the 
presence of random effects and heteroskedasticity. Therefore, I chose the random effects model 
with robust regression to estimate them. 
The result of the first stage analysis shows that income significantly influences the school 
enrollment rate and child labour participation with expected signs. Therefore, there is a need to 
proceed to the second stage of the empirical model – the shock model. 
In the shock model, since school infrastructure and transport infrastructure and agriculture 
employment are time invariant in nature given the short time panel of four years, I have not 
considered them. Mid-day meal coverage could possibly be taken in the shock model, but during 
the study period between 1999 and 2002, the scheme was in the stage of implementation5. So, 
many states may not have had the capacity to provide mid-day meals in case of a massive, 
sudden rise in the number of enrolled school children. Therefore, I have dropped the coverage of 
the mid-day meal in the shock model. 
I’ve removed the linear time trend from the variables CW, CS and Y, and the residuals of the 
series are named DCW, DCS, and DY, respectively. Residuals of each variable are proxy for 
shock components of each variable. The time trend for each variable has been estimated for each 
district separately. 
Generating the shock components, we get 
                                                                         (12) 
                         (13) 
       (14) 
Where i = district and t = time, 
DCS = shock to children school enrollment 
DCW = shock to child labour participation 
DY= shock to real consumption  
Where  DY> is defined as positive income shocks and DY< is defined as adverse income shocks. 
The shock model of children’s school enrollment and child labour participation model is as 
follows. 
                                                           
5 The mid‐day meal scheme has a long history especially in Tamil Nadu and Gujarat, and has now been expanded to 
all parts of India after a landmark direction by the Supreme Court of India on November 28, 2001. 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       (15) 
       (16) 
The expected co-efficient signs are ψ>0, ξ<0. 
Table 5 presents the results of the shock model. Equation 15 shows a presence of random effects, 
time-fixed effects and heteroskedasticity. Therefore, I have chosen the random effects model 
with time-fixed effects using robust regression. The results, as expected, are positive coefficients. 
Thus, during the adverse economic shock children are not likely to join school. Equation 16 
shows a presence of random effects and heteroskedasticity. Therefore I have chosen the random 
effects model using robust regression. 
Table 5. The Empirical Results of Economic Shocks on Child Labour and Children School 
Enrollment 
  Dependent Variable  
 CS CW 
Name of Independent Variable Fixed Random Random Fixed Random, Robust Fixed Random Random 
Random, 
Robust 
DY 5.92*** 5.83*** 5.17*** 5.24*** 5.17*** -1.69*** -1.68*** -1.31** -1.68*** 
 [1.69] [1.69] [1.75] [1.75] [1.83] [0.66] [0.57] [0.59] [0.58] 
Year=2000   1.09 1.05 1.09   0.16  
   [1.08] [1.08] [1.03]   [0.36]  
Year=2001   3.30*** 3.32*** 3.30***   -0.67*  
   [1.10] [1.10] [1.05]   [0.37]  
Year=2002   2.80*** 2.79*** 2.80***   0.29  
   [1.08] [1.08] [0.96]   [0.36]  
Constant 76.32*** 76.28*** 74.49*** 74.54*** 74.49*** 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 
 [0.38] [0.69] [0.96] [0.77] [0.77] [0.15] [0.13] [0.26] [0.13] 
Observations 1543 1543 1543 1543 1543 1543 1543 1543 1543 
No. of Districts 385 385 385 385 385 385 385 385 385 
Diagnostics Tests   
Hausman test (Prob> chi2)# 0.04         0.97       
BPLM test  (Prob> chi2)##  0.00     0.00   
Joint test (Prob> f) ###   0.01 0.01    0.05  
Wald test (Prob> chi2)####       0.00       0.00   
# Null hypothesis is that the preferred model is random effects vs. the alternative (the fixed effects).  
## Null hypothesis is that all the year coefficients are jointly equal to zero  
 ### Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (BPLM) test, Null hypothesis is that variances across districts is zero.  
#### Null hypothesis is homoskedasticity.  
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%.  
Robust standard errors and standard errors in brackets.  
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Results Discussion 
Predictions of the theoretical model are in line with the empirical model results. First, I discuss 
the determinants of children’s school enrollment rate and child labour participation.  
In the children’s school enrollment model, the coefficient of real consumption π is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Conversely, in the child labour participation model, 
the coefficient of real consumption α is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. Thus, these findings show that income channels are strong influences on children’s 
education and incidence of child labour. It is observed that the policy outcome of lifting the 
income takes a long time. So, in the interim, the transfer of resources is very necessary to arrest 
child labour participation and increase school enrollment.  
As of 2002, the agricultural sector accounted for 65 percent of the child labour in the country. 
This has also been revealed in the results of this study. In the child labour model, the agricultural 
employment coefficient β is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. In the 
children’s school enrollment model, the agricultural employment coefficient κ is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. These could be interpreted as demand side channels 
since child labour is normally less skillful and repetitive in nature. So, such work might have a 
lot of scope in the agricultural sector rather than the non-agricultural sector. 
In the children’s school enrollment model, the education infrastructure coefficient ν is positive 
and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Also, the transport infrastructure coefficient τ is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This could be because of the lack of 
transport infrastructure, which might act as a barrier to children’s education for those households 
who don’t have middle schools close to their residence. As of NSSO 2007-08, 21 percent of rural 
households didn’t have schools with middle classes within 2 kilometers of their residence. 
The mid-day meal programme has positively influenced the children’s school enrollment rate. In 
the children’s school enrollment model, the coverage of the mid-day meal programme coefficient 
ρ is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
In the child labour model, only real consumption and agricultural employment are expected 
coefficients and statistical significantly at the 5 percent level or above. Though the other 
explanatory variable coefficients have turned out as expected, they are not statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level. This could be because the children may have the option of not going 
school and not being part of the labour force, or the households could be misreporting if the child 
is employed in gainful economic activity. 
In the shock model, the adverse economic coefficient ψ is positive and statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level, and adverse economic coefficient ξ is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level. This proves that child labour in India is counter-cyclical. 
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Limitations 
The limitation of the study is that the 58th round of NSSO’s survey has a shorter reference period 
than the other rounds used in the study. However, the exclusion of the 58th round data does not 
change the result findings. 
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
The study concludes that child labour in Indian is counter-cyclical. So, any temporary adverse 
shock in India will lead to permanent consequences to the economy. This will be visible in the 
long run and be detrimental to the human capital formation of the country. There are lots of 
reasons to argue why the government should put enough resources to break the counter-cyclical 
behaviour of child labour participation. Most importantly, the public return on children’s 
education would be very high as compared to the private rate of return. The literature also 
supports that the private return on education rises after additional levels of schooling from the 
threshold schooling level. Another important factor in developing countries like India is that 
during an adverse economic shock, households face the bigger question of survival rather than 
optimization of current vs. future streams of income. Since the poor households do not have 
access to the formal credit market they are forced to make a flawed decision. The theoretical 
model shows that during an adverse economic shock, the government should raise the existing 
in-kind transfers to poor children who attend the school. Maintaining the status quo in the in-kind 
transfer scheme may not yield any improvement on in children’s school enrollment. 
For future studies, it would be interesting to analyse the latest rounds to see the effects the global 
economic crises of 2007-08 and the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) in the 
child labour market. NREGA may have acted as a counter-shock policy. It could be that the 
incidence of child labour may not have risen in these periods of adverse economic shocks. So, in 
summation, an apt research question would be ‘Did NREGA help to break the counter-cyclical 
behaviour of the incidence of child labour in India? If not, to what extent did it mitigate the 
damage of the economic shock?’ 
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